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Abstract From 1959 until 1969, Heidegger lectured to
psychiatrists and psychiatry students at the University of
Zurich Psychiatric Clinic and in Zollikon. The transcrip-
tions of these lectures were published as the Zollikon
Seminars. In these seminars Heidegger is highly critical of
psychoanalysis, because of its causal and objectifying
approach to the human being. In general, Heidegger con-
siders it an objectification or even an elimination of the
human being to approach a patient from a causal per-
spective. In our view Heidegger has overlooked the
peculiar nature and complexity of psychotherapy and
psychiatry, namely that psychiatry is not just a discipline
that combines a hermeneutical approach and a natural
science approach on a theoretical level, but it also deals
with psychopathology in practice. We argue, also referring
to Strawson and Gadamer, that in psychiatric practice
causal explanation and hermeneutic understanding are no
mutually exclusive approaches. We conclude that the
encounter of philosophy and psychiatry in matters of cau-
sality and motivation could be particularly fruitful when
the practical situation is addressed, recognizing the special
character of psychopathology.
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Introduction
The interface between philosophy and psychiatry is gaining
more and more interest.1 Within this context Karl Jaspers,
philosopher and psychiatrist, is mentioned quite regularly.2
Heidegger, however, one of the most influential philoso-
phers of the twentieth century, is usually not paid much
attention to.3 Yet, the link between Heidegger and psy-
chiatry seems to be rather obvious. From 1959 until 1969,
Heidegger lectured to psychiatrists and psychiatry students
at the University of Zurich Psychiatric Clinic and in Zo-
llikon. The transcriptions of these lectures were published
as the Zollikon Seminars by the psychiatrist and initiator of
these lecture meetings, Medard Boss. Boss writes:
From the very beginning, as he himself once admit-
ted, Heidegger had set great hope on an association
with a doctor who had a seemingly extensive
understanding of his [Heidegger’s] thought. He saw
the possibility that his philosophical insights would
not be confined merely to the philosopher’s quarters
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1 See, e.g., the Oxford series International Perspectives in Philos-
ophy and Psychiatry, edited by Fulford, Sadler, Stanghellini, Morris.
And, more in specific the Oxford Textbook of Philosophy of
Psychiatry, edited by Fulford, Thornton and Graham (2006).
2 See, e.g., Bolton and Hill 1996, p. xvii, and also D. Denys (2007),
‘How new is the new philosophy of psychiatry?’
3 A recent exception is Svenaeus (2007). It has to be noted that also
in the Oxford Textbook of Philosophy of Psychiatry (2006) Heidegger
is being paid attention to.
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but also might benefit many more people, especially
people in need of help.4
The Zollikon Seminars appeared in German in 1987
(edited by Boss) and were translated into English in 2001.
In these lectures many different topics are discussed, for
instance the nature of the human body5 and the measur-
ability of phenomena. One important theme is the issue of
causal explanation in relation to psychotherapy. It is this
topic that we will explore in this paper. First, we will focus
on Heidegger’s criticism of causal explanation, especially
in Freudian psychoanalysis. Second, we will argue that
Heidegger has overlooked the complexity of the practice of
psychotherapy and psychiatry. We will illustrate our
objection to Heidegger’s criticism of causal explanation in
psychopathological conditions by presenting two examples
taken from everyday medical practice and by pointing out
that causal explanation in the practice of psychiatry and
psychotherapy is not necessarily ‘inhumane’, i.e., elimi-
nating the human being qua human being (reducing her to
an object), as Heidegger seems to suggest.
Before starting our discussion of Heidegger’s criticism
of causal explanation in psychotherapy, however, we want
to make three introductory remarks. First, under the title
Zollikon Seminars we do not only find the transcriptions of
Heidegger’s lectures to psychiatrists and psychiatry stu-
dents. In fact, the Zollikon Seminars consist of three parts.
Part one contains the protocols or transcriptions of the
lectures (from 1959–1969), part two contains accounts of
conversations between Heidegger and the psychiatrist Boss
(from 1961–1972), and part three contains letters from
Heidegger to Boss (1947–1971). In the Introduction Boss
points out that the text of the Zollikon Seminars is trust-
worthy: Heidegger has seen the transcripts of the lectures
and has been able to correct them (Heidegger 1987, p.
XIV). And also an important part of the conversations has
been looked at by Heidegger himself, and the letters, of
course, have been written by Heidegger. Boss, though, has
made a selection, not only from the letters, but often he
also has omitted parts of their contents.
Second, as will become clear in the next section,
Heidegger has been very critical towards Freud and psy-
choanalysis. Yet, during the second half of the twentieth
century, Heidegger also inspired psychoanalysists. Usually,
Lacan6 is referred to as an important example of his
influence on the development of psychoanalytic thought.7
Heidegger’s fierce criticism of psychoanalysis on the one
hand and the role of Heidegger’s philosophy in psycho-
analytic thought on the other, has led to a debate about the
compatibility of ‘Heidegger’ and ‘Freud’.8 Although such a
debate may certainly have its importance, we will not
engage into it.9 We will only discuss Heidegger’s critique
on psychoanalysis in relation the focus of our paper,
namely the role of causal explanation in psychotherapy and
medical practice.
Third, even though Heidegger’s philosophy is often
considered ‘obscure’, the confrontation with psychiatrists
during the 1960s seems to bring forward a more ‘accessi-
ble’ Heidegger, while most of the central themes of his
thought remain present.
Heidegger’s criticism of causal explanation, in
particular in psychoanalysis
It is well known that Heidegger is highly critical about causal
explanation in psychoanalysis in the Zollikon Seminars.10 In
this section we will discuss some relevant passages in which
Heidegger addresses Freud’s psychoanalysis and metapsy-
chology. The first quote is taken from one of his conversations
with Medard Boss in which Heidegger remarks:
The human being is essentially in need of help
because he is always in danger of losing himself and
of not coming to grips with himself. This danger is
connected with the human being’s freedom. The
entire question of the human being’s capacity for
being ill is connected with the imperfection of his
unfolding essence. Each illness is a loss of freedom, a
constriction of the possibility for living. The ‘‘psy-
choanalytic life history’’ is by no means a history, but
a naturalistic chain of causes, a chain of cause and
effect, and even more a constructed one.11
4 Heidegger (2001, p. xvii), translation adjusted.
5 See Bracken (1999).
6 Lacan also features in the Zollikon Seminars. Heidegger writes to
Boss: ‘‘Surely, you also received the thick book by Lacan (Ecrits).
For the moment I have not gotten around to reading this obviously
baroque text.’’ (Heidegger. 2001 p. 279) Some months later,
Heidegger writes to Boss: ‘‘(...) I am enclosing a letter from Lacan.
It seems to me that the psychiatrist needs a psychiatrist. Perhaps you
Footnote 6 continued
can write a few short notes for me when you send it back.’’ (He-
idegger, 2001 pp. 280–1)
7 See, e.g., Lang, Brunnhuber and Wagner (2003).
8 See Jackson (2007, p. 251): As Jackson points out: ‘‘The theme of
the possibility or impossibility of the compatibility between Heideg-
gerian philosophy and Freudian metapsychology has been taken up in
various ways. Arguments in favor of such a compatibility often rely
on an appeal to the psychoanalysis of Jacques Lacan, whose reading
of Freud seems to have been inspired in certain ways by Heidegger.’’
See also Bolton and Hill (1996, p. xv).
9 See for this debate, e.g., F. Dallmayr. Heidegger and Freud.
Political Psychology, Vol. 14, No. 2, Special Issue: Political Theory
and Political Psychology (Jun., 1993), pp. 235–253.
10 Jackson (2007, p. 251).
11 Heidegger 2001, pp. 157–158, translation slightly adjusted.
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This quote shows the central problem with psycho-
analysis according to Heidegger: psychoanalysis
understands a person’s history as a causal chain, and a
‘constructed’ one. In the same conversation Heidegger
even raises the question whether or not the human being is
at all present in Freudian libido theory:
Is the human being present within the total construct
of Freudian libido theory at all? (...) Attempts to
explain human phenomena on the basis of instincts
have the characteristic method of a science whose
object field is not the human being at all but rather
mechanics. Therefore, it is fundamentally question-
able whether such a method, determined by
nonhuman objectivity, is able to assert anything about
the human being as a human being.12
Heidegger also suggests that Freud was specifically
trying to find a causal approach to human phenomena.
According to Heidegger such an approach could not be
derived from ‘conscious’ human activity, and therefore
Freud had to invent the ‘unconscious’:
For conscious human phenomena, he [Freud] also
postulates an unbroken [chain] of explanation, that is,
the continuity of causal connections. Since there is no
such thing ‘‘within consciousness,’’ he has to invent
‘‘the unconscious’’ in which there must be an
unbroken [chain of] causal connections. The postu-
late is the complete explanation of psychical life
whereby explanation [Erkla¨ren] and understanding
[Verstehen] are identified. This postulate is not
derived from the psychical phenomena themselves
but is a postulate of modern natural science.13
It is fair to say that for Heidegger the essential problem
in Freud’s theory is the unconscious, which enabled Freud
to conceive of a human being as a causally determined
object. Therefore, Heidegger (2001, p. 254) rejects the
concept of the unconscious, and speaks about ‘‘the fatal
distinction between the conscious and the unconscious’’.
We will not enter into discussions about whether Heideg-
ger is right in his conception that psychoanalysis and the
notion of the unconscious necessarily bring an exclusively
causal perspective, like in the natural sciences. But it
becomes clear that Heidegger considers Freud’s
undertaking as a fundamentally causal theory, akin to the
natural sciences. Heidegger (2001, p. 208), however, also
understands Freud’s metapsychology as rooted in a philo-
sophical current: ‘‘Freud’s metapsychology is the
application of Neo-Kantian philosophy to the human being.
On the one hand, he [Freud] has the natural sciences, and
on the other hand, the Kantian theory of objectivity.’’
So, Freud combined natural science on the one hand and
Neo-Kantian philosophy on the other in his approach of the
human being. Now, one might expect that Heidegger
would not favour a combination of natural science and
philosophy as far as an approach to the human being is
concerned. Yet, surprisingly, Heidegger considers the
encounter of natural science and philosophy with respect to
psychiatry (implying the approach to the human being in
medical practice) as ‘productive’ and ‘exciting’: ‘‘It is
especially the case in psychiatry that the continuous
encounter between the thinking of the natural scientist and
that of the philosopher is very productive and exciting.’’
(Heidegger 2001, p. 238) Apparently, Heidegger’s discus-
sion of the encounter is not just born from negative
criticism, but also out of the search for new possibilities
and challenges.
However, according to Heidegger, as long as a causal
theoretical perspective is applied, this implies objectifica-
tion. For theories that ‘‘remain bound to the principle of
causality, (...) go along with the objectification of every-
thing that is. In this way they have already blocked forever
the view of the human being’s proper being-in-the-
world.’’14 (Heidegger 2001, p. 233) Now, according to
Heidegger, objectification fundamentally hampers psy-
chotherapy, since if
‘‘(...) psychotherapy can be done only if one objec-
tifies the being beforehand, because what is decisive
thereby is psychotherapy and not the existence of the
human being, and because one can [supposedly] only
do therapy, which is a concerned handling of objects,
and thus something purely technical, then the out-
come of such psychotherapy cannot result in a
healthier human being. In such a therapy, the human
being is finally eliminated. At best, such a therapy
could [only] result in a more polished object.’’15
12 Heidegger 2001, pp. 172. Cf. Dallmayr (1993, p. 235): ‘‘The main
difference derives from Heidegger’s objections to a positivist
construal of depth understanding, a construal which relies narrowly
on libidinal drives seen as a psycho-somatic causal mechanism. As
opposed to this construal, Heidegger proposes the approach of
‘‘existential analysis’’ (Daseinsanalyse) which accentuates human
openness to ‘‘being’’ mediated through human embodied insertion in
the world and in temporality.’’
13 Heidegger 2001, pp. 207–208, translation sligthly adjusted.
14 ‘Being-in-the-world’ is Heidegger’s term for the nature of our own
being (Being and Time 2002, pp. 78ff). Cf. Heidegger 2001, p. 196:
‘‘It would be necessary for medicine to search for the essential
potentiality-to-be human. If one looks for foundation in the causal-
genetic sense, one abandons the human being’s essence beforehand,
and thus one misses the question of what being human is.’’ Cf.
Heidegger 2001, pp. 209–210: ‘‘Causality plays a role in calculating
the lawlike sequence of one state after another. (…) I am surely not a
sequence of processes. That is not human.’’
15 Heidegger 2001, p. 215, translation slightly adjusted.
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As becomes clear in this quote, Heidegger’s theoretical
considerations culminate in this far reaching statement that
the human being would be finally eliminated in an objec-
tifying therapeutic approach. But what precisely is
eliminated in a causal approach? According to Heidegger,
‘‘Causality is an idea, an ontological determination. It
belongs to the determination of the ontological structure of
nature. Motivation refers to the human being’s existence in
the world as a being who acts and experiences.’’16 Cau-
sality has, thus, to be distinguished from motivation, the
former being about nature, the latter being about a human
being—and psychiatry and psychotherapy are about the
human being.17 Yet, we could suppose that from the causal
perspective, it is still possible to understand the human
being as a motivated being. But this does not seem to be
Heidegger’s view, as becomes clear when he phrases the
distinction between causality and motivation in the well
known pair of determinism and freedom:
Determinism denies freedom and yet by denying it, it
already must presuppose a certain idea of freedom.
Freedom as represented in the natural sciences has
always been understood as non-causal, as an a-causal
occurrence. Therefore, determinism [as causal deter-
mination] remains outside of freedom from the start.
Freedom has nothing to do with causality. Freedom is
to be free and open for being claimed by something.
This claim is then the ground of action, the motive. It
has nothing whatsoever to do with causal chains.
What claims [the human being] is the motive for
human response. Being open for a claim lies outside
the dimension of causality. Thus, determinism does
not even come close to realm of freedom in the first
place. It cannot say anything about freedom at all.
Therefore, as far as freedom is concerned it does not
matter at all whether we know all the causes or none
of the causes, or how many causes a thing has.18
So, there is a fundamental rift between the realm of
motivation and freedom on the one hand, and the domain
of nature and causality on the other. A causal approach will
never be able to recognize and to do justice to the human
being as a motivated and free being.19 Yet, according to
Heidegger, in the end ‘‘[w]e do psychology, sociology, and
psychotherapy in order to help the human being reach the
goal of adjustment and freedom in the broadest sense.’’20
As mentioned above, Heidegger’s reconstruction of
Freud’s endeavor is that the postulate of natural sciences on
the one hand, and Kantian philosophy on the other led him
to develop his metapsychology. In The Essence of Human
Freedom, written almost forty years before the quoted
statement on freedom and causality, Heidegger criticized
Kant for approaching freedom from the perspective of
causality.21 Apparently, he has not essentially changed his
mind. So, in this vein, the application of a causal theory on
a human being seeking help from a doctor or psychother-
apist, will not do justice to him or her as a free human
being. Causal theories should, so seems to be the message,
be left aside in psychotherapy if the realm of motivation
and freedom is to be preserved in the therapeutic context.
However, in our view, the actual situation in psychotherapy
and psychiatry is more complex than Heidegger suggests.22
Does Heidegger overlook the praxis of psychiatry and
the nature of psychopathology?
In the Zollikon Seminars Heidegger is lecturing to psy-
chiatrists about psychotherapy; he is not lecturing to
psychologists. Yet, Heidegger is concerned with general
(meta)psychological theories and considerations. Now, as
Bolton and Hill state, ‘‘[i]nevitably psychiatry has inherited
all the philosophical or conceptual problems of psychol-
ogy, including the problem of meaning and causality, but it
faces further specific ones of its own.’’ (1996, p. xvi, our
16 Heidegger 2001, p. 24, translation slightly adjusted. See also in a
letter to Boss: ‘‘But it also seems important to make clear to the
seminar participants what fundamental opposition lies behind the
properly made distinction between causality and motivation. It must
become clear that it is not only concerned with a methodological
(technical-practical) distinction, but with a fundamentally different
way of determining being human and the determining the human
being’s position in contemporary world civilization. Only by reflect-
ing on this does the full importance of the distinction come to light.’’
(Heidegger 2001, p. 280)
17 Heidegger (2001, p. 135): ‘‘The theme of physics is inanimate
nature. The theme of psychiatry and psychotherapy is the human
being.’’
18 Heidegger 2001, p. 217.
19 Within the scope of this paper we will not further discuss the issue
of freedom and determinism. We use this quote by Heidegger to show
that within his philosophy there is a radical distinction between the
domain of motivation on the one hand, and the domain of causality on
the other.
20 Heidegger 2001, p. 154.
21 Heidegger (2005, pp. 205–208). Cf. Muchada (2005): ‘‘At the
close of his lecture course on the Essence of Human Freedom,
Heidegger suggests that while for Kant freedom is a kind of causality,
understood in terms of the ontological difference, the reverse is true:
causality is grounded in freedom. This is the case because causality is
a way of understanding the being of beings (Sein des Seiendes), such
understanding however is rooted in the ‘letting something stand over
against as something given’.’’
22 Cf. Fulford, Thornton and Graham (2006): ‘‘One recurrent theme
of this book [Oxford Textbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry] is the
relation between reasons and causes in psychiatry. Whereas many
disciplines operate with one or other form of explanation and
interpretation, psychiatry operates with both. Nowhere is the tension
between the two as great as the issue of freedom versus causal
determinism.’’
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italics) Heidegger does pay attention to the problems
inherited of psychology, but he does not seem to pay
attention to what might be specifically relevant to psychi-
atrists and psychotherapists: psychopathology. In the
practice of their work psychiatrists and psychotherapists
have to do with ‘illness’ or ‘mental disorder’. In our view,
there is a relevant difference between general psychology
and psychopathology—relevant to psychiatrists and to the
issue of causal explanation: ‘‘There are certainly problems
with construing meaningful mental states as causes of
behavior already in the normal case, but there is a further
reason for doubting the relevance of meaningful explana-
tion in the case of disorder.’’ (Bolton and Hill 1996, xvi,
our italics) According to Bolton and Hill ‘‘the reason is
simple, on the surface, namely, that the notion of disorder
is applied precisely at the point where meaning comes to an
end.’’ The notion of (mental) disorder comes into play
exactly on the point ‘‘when there is (serious) failure of
meaningful connection between mental states and reality,
or among mental states, or between mental states and
action.’’ So, in this sense, mental disorders are conceptually
related with the ‘‘breakdown of meaning’’, and at such
instances it is plausible that we require ‘‘explanation in
terms of non-meaningful processes’’. In these situations we
may posit mechanisms that do not have to do with
‘meaning’, like physical causation. This apparently
straightforward connection between (mental) disorder and
non-meaningful or causal explanation is ‘‘overshadowed,
however, because the issue of where the limits of the
meaningful lie presses hard.’’23
Bolton and Hill clearly show the unique situation in the
case of psychopathology. The issue of causal explanation
seems to be implied in the concept of psychopathology
itself. Yet, it is unclear how and to which extent this
exactly is the case. But, surely, the fact that this matter is
not settled, does not imply that the issue itself becomes
irrelevant – on the contrary. It is highly important to con-
sider the issue of whether, indeed, psychopathology already
implies a form of causal explanation, and to which extent.
Bolton and Hill correctly state that psychiatry incorpo-
rates all the philosophical problems of psychology. So,
Heidegger is perfectly right in discussing psychological
theories when lecturing to psychiatrists. In fact, psychiatry
is often considered to be a discipline composed of a set of
activities subsuming neuroscientific, psychological and
sociological approaches.24 Yet, Heidegger is also interested
in the perspective of psychiatric practice: the doctor/ther-
apist and her patient. More specifically, Heidegger’s
concern seems to be, as we saw above, to do justice to the
patient as a human being in this practical situation. And
Heidegger seems to realize that this therapeutic situation
calls for a specific approach, for he writes: ‘‘In order to be
able to give a sufficiently clear interpretation of the rela-
tionship between the psychiatrist and the patient (...), some
medical experience, which I lack, is necessary as well.
Here, as elsewhere, I am dependent on the cooperation of
the seminar participants.’’25 Heidegger shows some hesi-
tation here, as it comes to the actual practice of
psychotherapy and psychiatry; he acknowledges the rele-
vance of it, realizing that his knowledge is not sufficient to
analyze this situation, and that he is in need of psychiatric
expertise.
In an approach that engages into the practical doctor-
patient relationship it is of course important to pay
attention to the fact that the identification of a psycho-
pathological condition in the therapeutic situation might
already imply the absence or ‘‘breakdown’’ (Bolton and
Hill, xvi) of meaning. In other words, even aside from
scientific and (meta)psychological theories, there may be
some understanding about causality at work in the practical
situation of psychotherapy, precisely in the way Bolton and
Hill have explained. In our view, because Heidegger is
interested in the therapeutic situation (that is characteristic
for psychopathology, not for psychology), he should have
paid attention to what is specific about it, in contrast with
the theoretical perspective of psychology. So, while it may
be that, as Mayr (Heidegger 2001, p. 312) writes in
the Translator’s Afterword to the Zollikon Seminars,
‘‘Heidegger wanted to free psychology (and its relevant
subdisciplines) from its uncritical adherence to Cartesian
‘‘thing’’ ontology and its concomitant trappings,’’ when
addressing the practice of therapy Heidegger should not
have limited his account to psychological theories and their
adherence to a specific ontology. Psychology is a science
using theories concerning general mental functioning,
while psychiatry is a medical practice using theories con-
cerning pathological mental functioning.
Of course, one should consider that psychiatry was
much more in the hands of psychoanalysts in the sixties
than it is today and that psychology for some part equaled
Freudian metapsychology.26 Metapsychology was one of
the super theories of psychiatry in the sixties. As far as the
theory of psychiatry is concerned it was understandable
23 All quotes from Bolton and Hill (1996, p. xvi).
24 See Brendel (2000): ‘‘Like many of the philosophers and
psychiatrists discussed (...), Fulford and Wakefield have viewed
psychiatry as a pluralistic set of activities subsuming neuroscience,
psychology, sociology, and ethics. Their notion of conceptual
pluralism in psychiatry can serve as the basis for humane and well-
balanced clinical services.’’
25 Heidegger 2001, p. 274. See also, from a letter to Boss: ‘‘You
know that the problems of psychopathology and psychotherapy
regarding their principles interest me very much, although I lack the
technical knowledge and command of the actual research.’’ (Heideg-
ger 2001, p. 237)
26 See, e.g., Svenaeus (2001, p. 40).
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that Heidegger addressed Freudian metapsychology when
lecturing to psychiatrists. Yet, a difference remains
between the understanding of ‘normal’ behavior and the
explanation of psychopathological behavior (as Bolton and
Hill discussed). So, at least the difference between psy-
chiatric practice and psychological theory does not seem to
be sufficiently recognized in the Zollikon Seminars. In
short, Heidegger does not pay attention to the way causal
explanations and hermeneutic understanding seem to be
intertwined in psychiatric practice.27
Causal explanation at work
In section ‘‘Heidegger’s criticism of causal explanation, in
particular in psychoanalysis’’ we discussed that Heidegger
considered the human being to be eliminated in a causal
explanatory approach. In this section we will address our
critical question: Is it really ‘inhumane’, i.e. objectifying or
eliminating the human being, for a doctor to apply causal
explanation when confronted with a patient?28 First, we
will present two familiar examples, taken from everyday
medical practice, to deal with this question. One example
derived from a non-psychopathological situation (which
functions as a footboard for the second example) and one
derived from a psychopathological one. The purpose of
these examples is to bring forward the importance of
practice. Secondly, we will turn to Strawson and Gadamer
for further support of our claim about the relevance of the
practice of psychiatry.
Example 1: A non-psychopathological example
Suppose a person has a broken leg. He will be happy that a
doctor applies some causal explanation to this broken leg—
a part of the patient—in order to fix it. We do not consider
it ‘inhumane’, but rather ‘humane’ that she does apply such
an explanation in order to treat the patient. The doctor,
herself being a human being, seems to know when and in
what way to apply a causal theory. And, most importantly,
the application of the causal theory about a broken leg is
motivated by the fact that she recognizes that she is con-
fronted not with an object, but with another human being.
So, she knows when and how (to which extent) to apply a
causal theory. And the application is not opposite to seeing
the person as a human being, but motivated by it.
Heidegger seems to see this point (at least in part) but he
also seems to have a certain opinion about medical spe-
cialists (and psychiatrists are medical specialists), as
expressed in a conversation with Boss29:
‘‘For instance, when I give quinine to someone suf-
fering from malaria, I am merely the occasion for the
quinine killing the amoebas. The patient’s body [as
cause] then heals him. If the physician understands
his role as merely being-in-the-occasion [Anlass-
sein], then it is indeed still possible that the being-
with [the patient] can continue. But if the physician
were to understand himself in such a way that he has
brought about [caused] the healing of the patient as
an ‘‘object,’’ then the being human and the being-with
are lost. As a physician one must, as it were, stand
back and let the other human being be. These [deal-
ings with the patient as ‘‘being-with’’ or as an
‘‘object’’] are entirely different modes of comport-
ment, which cannot be distinguished from outside at
all. Herein lies the existential difference between a
family doctor and a specialist in a clinic. It is char-
acteristic that family doctors are a dying breed.’’30
This view on medical specialists would mean that it makes
a fundamental difference whether, with a broken leg, one is
transported to a clinic or to the general practitioner. Although
some people may recognize parts of what Heidegger says
here, it seems an oversimplification, and it shows some
black-and-white view on medical practice, that does not
seem to be very helpful to understand medical practice.
Heidegger does not pay attention to the fact that in a thera-
peutic relation, causal reasoning can be applied—not just
opposite to seeing a person as a human being, but exactly
motivated by the fact that the person is a human being, and he
also seems to doubt that such a ‘humane’ attitude is possible
for a medical specialist, like a psychiatrist, or a orthopedic
surgeon. Things get more interesting in psychopathology,
where it is not about legs, but about minds.
27 See also Svenaeus (2001) who approaches the intertwinement of
practice and theory from the perspective of a meeting of a patient and
doctor in which the concept of a dialogue is central: ‘‘What
characterizes a meeting, in contrast to scientific explanatory under-
standing, is (...) mutual, shared understanding. This does not mean
that the understanding of the two persons who meet must be totally
shared in the sense of being the same understanding.’’ (p. 146)
28 Within the context of this paper we will not address Heidegger’s
specific understanding of the concept of ‘humanism’. Cf. Heidegger’s
Letter on ‘‘Humanism’’ (1998). See Heidegger (2001, p. 154) for the
notion ‘humanitas’.
29 Boss himself started a psychiatric school of ‘‘Daseinsanalyse’’ in
which he tried to use Heidegger’s philosophy to create a theoretical
framework for psychiatric practice. In Psychoanalysis and Daseins-
analysis (1963) Boss also discusses causal explanation with respect to
psychoanalysis (referred to as ‘‘psychodynamics’’), and he, like
Heidegger, criticizes it: ‘‘The concept of ‘‘psychodynamics’’ tries to
derive every phenomenon from something else by assuming a causal
energy, capable of transforming itself into an appearing thing.’’ (1963,
p. 108) And Boss adds on the same page: ‘‘(...) we can throw
psychodynamics overboard as superfluous baggage.’’
30 Heidegger 2001, p. 210–211. One could object that Heidegger,
talking about quinine, overlooks the placebo-effect, but we will not
address this issue.
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Example 2: A psychopathological example
The person with the broken leg is operated upon and during
the night he becomes very ill and develops disturbances in
orientation and starts accusing the doctor of stealing his
properties, while the doctor provides nothing but good
care. At first the doctor might feel insulted because of the
unjust accusation, for it is clear that the doctor understands
the accusation as a verbal act of a human being. But should
the doctor feel insulted because of the accusations? Unless
she uses some sort of a ‘causal explanation’, she may feel
insulted, and act accordingly. However, as a doctor, she
might also take into account the probability that, the patient
being very ill and operated upon, has developed a delirium.
The accusations, then, have to be primarily understood in a
way that the patient is in a bad condition, and that treatment
is needed as soon as possible. The words about theft are
completely understood as verbal acts of a human being,
yet, they are not understood as the ‘motivated’ accusations
that they would be in the normal situation. They are con-
sidered as ‘caused’—in whatever specific sense, but still—
by the condition, a delirium.
In our view, it is not ‘inhumane’ that this doctor does not
consider the words of the patient primarily as ‘motivated’,
but as ‘caused’ by a mental disturbance due to a severe
physical condition. When the doctor would not consider
this a ‘causal’ mechanism, but as fully ‘motivated’, and if
she would, perhaps, be outraged about the accusations and
would act accordingly, would there be more ‘humanity’ in
her action? This is of course a rhetoric question. It is not
‘inhumane’ to apply causal explanation in certain situations
of (psycho)pathology. Not recognizing behavior as
‘caused’, but considering it as ‘motivated’ may hamper
appropriate treatment and result in adverse consequences to
the patient.
Suppose the treatment of the patient is successful and he
quickly recovers. The next morning he thanks the doctor
for her good care. He does not seem to remember much
about what happened during the night. Should the doctor
consider his gratefulness ‘causal behavior’, or ‘motivated
behavior’? We think the latter would apply. But is the
doctor more ‘humane’ now than during the night when she
applied causal explanation about the influence of severe
physical disturbance on the mind? We don’t think so. Both
responses can be considered ‘humane’, and motivated from
the understanding that she is dealing not with an object, but
with a human being. Although the first response (during the
night) can, in addition, be considered a professional
response; it can be considered exactly the response one
would expect from a doctor.
In order to further develop our critical note on He-
idegger’s account, we turn to Strawson. In his seminal
paper ‘Freedom and Resentment’ about moral attitudes
Strawson also addresses the therapeutic situation. Strawson
distinguishes between two kinds of moral attitudes. The
first is the ‘participant’ attitude, linked to perceiving an
agent as part of the moral community. Such a member of
the moral community is a true candidate for praise and
blame. The second type of attitude is the ‘objective’ atti-
tude (2003, p. 80). This attitude we have, according to
Strawson, towards children (to some extent) and towards
adults suffering from mental disorder (see, e.g., Strawson
2003, pp. 78, 79, 81). Strawson states the following with
respect to the attitude of a psychoanalyst to his patient:
‘‘His objectivity of attitude, his suspension of ordin-
ary reactive attitudes, is profoundly modified by the
fact that the aim of the enterprise is to make such
suspension unnecessary or less necessary. Here we
may and do naturally speak of restoring the agent’s
freedom. But here the restoring of freedom means
bringing it about that the agent’s behavior shall be
intelligible in terms of conscious purposes rather than
in terms only of unconscious purposes. This is the
object of the enterprise; and it is in sofar as this object
is attained that the suspension or half-suspension of
ordinary moral attitudes is deemed no longer neces-
sary or appropriate.’’ (p. 88)
Strawson pays attention to the fact that in a psycho-
therapeutic situation there is an objectifying stance or
attitude at work in order to make a ‘participant’ attitude
possible. This is in line with our criticism of Heidegger, as
far as the alleged ‘inhumanity’ of an objectifying attitude is
concerned in psychiatric practice.
The difference between Strawson and our view is that
Strawson seems not to be particularly interested in the
exact nature of these attitudes and how they come about,
and what makes a psychiatrist’s attitudes change,31 while
we propose that precisely the analysis of these attitudes
could be valuable to understand our intuitions about causal
explanation and meaning. So, while Strawson repeatedly
refers to mental disorders and even to therapy and the
‘psychoanalyst’, he does not indicate that the psychiatric or
therapeutic situation as such should be studied philosoph-
ically or interdisciplinary.32 Strawson seems to take our
31 Strawson himself is mainly interested in finding a solution to the
problem of determinism and moral responsibility or freedom. His
paper is not directly about causal explanation. Yet, it is clear that
Strawson is not so much concerned with the exact causes of these
reactive attitudes (2003, p.77).
32 While Strawson clearly indicates that psychology has changed our
view about moral responsibility, he also claims a separate position for
the philosopher who has ‘‘to take account of the facts in all their
bearings; we are not to suppose that we are required, or permitted, as
philosophers, to regard ourselves, as human beings, as detached from
the attitudes which, as scientists, we study with detachment.’’ (2003,
p. 93)
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attitudes and the psychiatrist’s attitudes for granted. He
perceives them as some sort of ‘commitment’ that is ‘‘part
of the general framework of human life’’ (2003, p.83).
‘‘The existence of the general framework of attitudes itself
is something we are given with the fact of human society,’’
as Strawson puts it (2003, p. 91) The commitment and
therefore our reactive attitudes are ‘in our nature’ (2003, p.
87). To Strawson there seems not to be a problem or further
issue.33 He does not raise the question when and how the
‘objectifying’ and ‘participating’ attitude take turns. Why
do we find certain reactive attitudes in psychiatric practice
when encountering persons suffering from mental disorder,
what brings them about?
The importance of a special focus on the practice of
psychiatry can be made clear by referring to a pupil of
Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer. He writes in the chapter
on hermeneutics and psychiatry in his The Enigma of
Health:
‘‘Praxis, however, is not merely an application of
scientific knowledge. Rather, aspects of praxis react
back on research, and the results of research must
consistently prove and confirm themselves in turn
with reference to praxis. There are, then, good rea-
sons why doctors do not see their profession as
equivalent either to that of the scientist or researcher,
or to that of a mere technician, who would simply
‘apply’ scientific knowledge and discoveries with the
purpose of restoring health. Part of what a doctor
does closely resembles an art, and is something which
cannot be conveyed through theoretical instruction. It
is this which it is appropriate to call the ‘art of
healing’. Praxis is more than the mere application of
knowledge. And ‘practice’ refers to the complete
sphere of life of the medical profession, and not
simply to ‘the practice’ as one specific workplace
among others in the whole world of work. Praxis
possesses its own unique world.’’34 (Gadamer 1996 p.
163)
The implication of this is that psychiatry is not just the
discipline where hermeneutics and psychological or phys-
iological theory meet (which is the focus of Bolton and
Hill), but that the practice of psychiatry could bring for-
ward its own insights in our ‘attitudes’ or intuitions about
causality and motivation. Practice cannot be reduced to the
application of theoretical knowledge. In our view, it was no
accident that Strawson in his famous paper referred to
mental disorders and to a psychoanalyst. Being confronted
with mental disorders our attitudes and intuitions are put to
the test.
Psychopathology and causal explanation
Causal explanation in some form seems to be present in
everyday medical practice. As far as a mental disturbance
is concerned, as in a delirium, causal explanation cannot be
simply understood from the perspective of mere psycho-
logical theories, nor can it be considered to exclude the
view on another person as a human being. In some situa-
tions causal explanation seems to be at work and
appropriate, in other instances the same goes for ‘herme-
neutic’ or ‘participating’ understanding. And applying
causal explanation is itself motivated by recognizing the
other person as a human being in need for treatment. This
kind of complexity of the doctor-patient relationship is
absent in the Zollikon Seminars. And this is where our
criticism applies. As far as Heidegger is discussing thera-
peutic practice, he should at least have acknowledged the
peculiar characteristics of it with respect to causal expla-
nation and considering a human being as a human being.35
What is valuable about Heidegger’s approach, is that he
perceives the relevance of the practical psychiatric situa-
tion, and that he makes clear that, when we try to
understand this practice, philosophers and psychiatrists
should cooperate—Heidegger himself signaled that he
would be in need of psychiatrists’ help should he address
medical practice. Yet, our criticism towards Heidegger is
that, even while he recognizes the special character of a
psychotherapeutic situation, he fails to address the most
relevant and most specific point of the practice of psychi-
atry in relation to causal explanation. Heidegger, therefore,
also cannot discuss the issue whether the purpose of causal
explanation in psychiatry can be considered to restore the
very possibility of applying a hermeneutic or ‘participat-
ing’ approach.
It is exactly in practice, we think, that psychiatry in its
encounter of causal theory and philosophy becomes
‘exciting’ and potentially ‘productive’. Here, psychiatry
might not only benefit from philosophy, but, in accordance
with Fulford (1991), philosophy might even learn some-
thing from psychiatry. If Heidegger would have taken the
situation of psychiatry seriously in this way, this could also
33 We cannot go into further detail of Strawson’s account. Yet, we
would like to add that his account is meant to leave open the
compatibility of freedom and determinism, while Heidegger takes a
radical position about the ‘incompatibility’ in the Zollikon Seminars,
as we have seen.
34 Cf. Svenaeus (2001, especially part 3 on the hermeneutics of
medicine).
35 A possible third approach which would, in our view, underline the
discussed complexity of the therapeutic situation, can be found in
Widdershoven and Widdershoven-Heerding (2003), who call this a
‘hermeneutic approach’. They dwell on Aristoteles’s notion of
phronesis, a concept also important to the ‘young’ Heidegger,
Pha¨nomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles (1989).
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have meant engaging in new territory, where he, perhaps,
could not simply rely on his rather black-and-white criti-
cism of psychology and Freud’s metapsychology. When
Heidegger would have paid attention to the peculiar phe-
nomenon of psychopathology in relation to causal
explanation, it would also have been interesting to see how
his intuitions about a radical distinction between the realm
of freedom and the realm of causality would work out.
Causal explanation and hermeneutic understanding are, as
it seems, in medical practice no mutually excluding
approaches. So, the practical questions arise: what is a
psychopathological condition? When exactly should we
apply a causal theory? What are the intuitions or principles
by which psychiatrists choose between causal and non-
causal explanations? Where lies the border between
motives and causation?
It is clear that Heidegger thinks that psychotherapy is in
danger36 of some hostile take-over by a psychology that
applies the methods of the natural sciences to human
beings which leads to the objectification or reduction of the
patient into an object. We have tried to show that the
therapeutic situation may be more complex than that, with
causal explanation already at work because the patient’s
condition has been recognized as psychopathological.
Bolton and Hill (1996, p. xvii) are right that ‘‘[w]hile the
philosophy of psychology has a long and familiar history,
and is currently flourishing, the philosophy of psychiatry
has been relatively neglected.’’ We think that the philoso-
phy of psychiatry has the best chance to flourish, when it
takes on what is specific or unique in psychiatric practice.
Conclusion
In the Zollikon Seminars Heidegger certainly recognized a
vital issue: the relationship between causal explanation on
the one hand and hermeneutics (understanding of motiva-
tion, the realm freedom) on the other as relevant to
psychiatry. Yet, psychiatry is not just a discipline that
combines hermeneutical and natural science approaches on
a theoretical level, but it essentially deals with psychopa-
thology, which already seems to bring some sort of causal
explanation. Moreover, it deals with psychopathology, not
just in theory, but also, and principally so, in practice. The
unique combination of psychopathology and medical
practice is not addressed by Heidegger. We have tried to
show that exactly these are the most interesting and
promising when philosophy encounters psychiatry in
matters of causality and motivation. So, our critical note on
the Zollikon Seminars implies that the potential of psy-
chiatry to philosophical reasoning on causal explanation
and motivated behavior lies first of all in its practice.
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